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ABSTRACT 
 
Investor confidence and the quality of reported information are primary issues in our current 
financial reporting environment as a result of recent scandals and financial crises. Assessing the 
quality of reported financial information is an important issue for investors. Can investors use 
corporate reputation to assess earnings quality? This paper examines the association between 
corporate reputation and earnings quality. We use a public measure – “America’s Most Admired 
Companies” – as a proxy for corporate reputation. These firms are considered to possess superior 
reputation. A cross-sectional accruals-based measure proxies for earnings quality. We compare 
the firms listed on America’s Most Admired Companies of 2006 to a sample of control firms and 
find that sample firms have higher earnings quality than control firms. Our results should be of 
interest to managers who engage in behavior leading to or maintaining a positive corporate 
reputation, and to financial analysts who conduct research on the impact of corporate reputation 
on earnings quality. Moreover, our study can increase individual investors’ confidence in 
assessing the earnings quality of companies with a superior reputation.  
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
his study examines the association between corporate reputation and the quality of a firm’s earnings. 
Earnings quality is an issue of increasing importance to investors especially after recent financial 
scandals and crises. Identifying signals of earnings quality would be useful to investors and others. 
To examine whether there is an association between firm reputation and earnings quality, we use a public measure – 
“America’s Most Admired Companies” – as a proxy for reputation. Fortune magazine has published annually a list 
of most-admired American companies since 1983. Firms on this list are selected by executives, directors, and 
securities analysts based on eight key areas. These areas are financial soundness, ability to attract and retain talented 
employees, quality of management, social responsibility, innovation, quality of products or service, wise use of 
assets, and investment value.  Firms selected to this list are considered to possess a superior reputation.  
 
An underlying assumption of the above selection criteria is that the companies’ accounting practices have 
integrity, otherwise many of these measures, like financial soundness, wise use of assets and investment value would 
become meaningless. As a result, we expect that firms on the “America’s Most Admired Companies” list have 
accounting practices with more integrity and higher earnings quality. Companies use discretion when applying 
accounting practices. With this discretion comes the possibility for both honest mistakes and dishonest mistakes, 
such as intentional manipulation of earnings. The intentional manipulation of earnings leads to lower earnings 
quality. To capture the earnings quality, we rely on the modified Jones (1991) model to calculate discretionary 
accruals. The absolute value of discretionary accruals is viewed as an inverse measure of earnings quality. That is, a 
higher absolute value of discretionary accruals suggests lower earnings quality.   
 
Our regression analysis reports a significant and negative relationship between the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals and reputation. The results suggest that firms with superior reputation also have superior 
quality in their earnings. Our results should be of interest to managers who engage in behavior leading to or 
maintaining a positive corporate reputation, to financial analysts who conduct research on determining the earnings 
quality of a firm. Moreover, our study can increase individual investors’ confidence in assessing the earnings quality 
of companies with a superior reputation.  
T 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior research and develops the 
hypothesis. Section 3 describes the research design, including measurement of earnings quality, empirical 
specifications, sample selection and descriptive statistics. Section 4 reports the results of our regression analysis, and 
Section 5 summarizes the paper.  
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
 
Reputation is defined by Fombrun (1996, p.72) as “a perceptual representation of a company’s past actions 
and future prospects that describe the firm’s overall appeal to all its key constituents when compared to other 
leading rivals.” Roberts and Dowling (2002) suggest that corporate reputation is a general organizational attribute 
that reflects the extent to which external stakeholders view the company as “good” and “bad”.  How does a good 
reputation affect a company? Based on Fombrun (1996), strategic management theory suggests that good reputation 
may create competitive advantages for firms, and strategic researchers also view a good reputation as a unique asset 
to a firm.  
 
Dowling (2001) suggests that the main drivers of reputation creation are embedded inside the firm. That is, 
characteristics of the company’s own performance drive reputation. A large body of empirical research (e.g. 
Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Herremans et al., 1993; Landon and Smith, 1997) has 
examined the relation between a firm’s reputation and its performance. These empirical studies support a positive 
relationship between reputation and economic performance. 
 
McLaughlin et al. (1996) find that most-admired firms tend to be highly profitable and to grow quickly. In 
addition, they find that firms on the most-admired list tend to acquire other firms. Similar to McLaughlin et al. 
(1996), Roberts and Dowling (2002) suggest that a firm with a good reputation may possess a cost advantage, since 
people prefer to work for firms with high reputations, and they work harder. Also, suppliers prefer to do business 
with high-reputation firms in order to reduce contractual hazards. Therefore, Roberts and Dowling (2002) suggest 
that firms with superior reputation are better able to maintain superior profitability over time.  
 
From a capital market point of view, Antunovich and Laster (1999) investigate the stock returns of firms on 
the most-admired list from 1982 to 1995. They documented that the most-admired decile of firms significantly 
outperformed the least-admired decile. Moreover, their findings reveal that even five years after the publication of 
the most-admired list the most-admired decile earned an average annual return of 17.7 percent, while the least-
admired decile only earned 12.5 percent. Damodaran (2003) suggests that investors should buy stocks of companies 
with a good reputation for products and management. The rationale was that a well-run company should be worth 
more than a poorly-run company. Anderson and Smith (2006) examine a portfolio of the stocks of firms on the 
most-admired list. They find that their portfolio of these stocks outperformed the market (proxied by S&P 500 
Index), whether these stocks were purchased on the publication date, or 5, 10, 15 or even 20 trading days later. 
However, Anderson and Smith (2006) do not offer an explanation for their findings.  Wang and Smith (2008) 
investigate the market values of firms with superior reputation. By using the Ohlson (1995) model, Wang and Smith 
(2008) report that firms with high reputation had an average market value premium of $1.3 billion. They conclude 
that firms with superior reputation are highly-valued by the capital markets. 
 
Chun (2005) reports that many academic disciplines have shown interest in reputation research. Accounting 
studies which examine the association between reputation and accounting variables have started to emerge. Francis 
et al. (2008) examine the association between CEO reputation and earnings quality. Using the extent of press 
coverage as proxy for CEO reputation, they find that more highly reputed CEOs are associated with poorer earnings 
quality. They conclude that firms with poor earnings quality required more highly reputed CEOs. By using a list of 
firms in China, Tan (2007) investigates the association between corporate reputation and earnings quality. Tan 
(2007) also uses a public measure – “World’s Most Respected Companies in China” – as a proxy for reputation. 
However, the results in Tan (2007) are inconclusive. Our study extends these studies in a number of ways. First, we 
focus on corporate reputation while Francis et al. (2008) focus on CEO reputation. Next, we use a more complete 
measure of earnings quality than Tan (2007). For example, it is unknown whether Tan (2007) estimates parameters 
of the cross-sectional model using all other firms in the same industry.  
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Based on the underlying assumption that firms on the “America’s Most Admired Companies” list have 
accounting practices with more integrity and, as a result, less earnings manipulation, we posit that firms with 
superior reputation also have superior earnings quality.  
 
Ha:  There is a positive association between firm reputation and earnings quality.  
 
3.  RESEARCH DESIGN, SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Measurement of the Primary Variable – Earnings Quality 
 
Prior research generally uses one of the two approaches to measure earnings quality. The first approach 
captures earnings quality by examining accounting variables. For example, Sloan (1996) measures earning quality 
by examining the level of accruals, while Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure earnings quality by examining the 
estimation error in accruals. The second approach examines the relationship between earnings and stock returns 
assuming market efficiency (e.g., Basu, 1997; Collins et al., 1999; Francis and Schipper, 1999).  
 
We use the first approach. Specifically, we measure earnings quality by investigating the level of 
discretionary accruals. We use the modified Jones (1991) model and a cross-sectional estimation method to capture 
discretionary accruals. The absolute value of discretionary accruals is viewed as an inverse measure of earnings 
quality. That is, a higher absolute value of discretionary accruals suggests lower earnings quality.   
 
Total accruals (TA) are measured as follows: 
 
TAi,t = NIi,t – CFFOi,t                                               (1) 
 
Where  
 
NIi,t = firm i’s net income (Compustat #18) in year t, 
CFFOi,t = firm i’s cash flow from operations (Compustat #308)  in year t. 
 
In order to estimate discretionary accruals for firm i in year t, we first estimate parameters of the cross-sectional 
modified Jones (1991) model using all other firms in the same industry (same first two-digit SIC as firm i). The 
model is as follows: 
 
TAj,t/Aj,t-1 = αj,t(1/Aj,t-1 ) + β1j,t [(ΔREVj,t – ΔRECEj,t)/Aj,t-1] + β2j,t[PPEj,t/Aj,t-1] + εj,t                       (2) 
 
Where 
 
TAj,t = industry j’s total accruals in year t, 
ΔREVj,t = industry j’s change in revenue (Compustat Item #12) between year (t-1) and year t, 
ΔRECEj,t = industry j’s change in receivables (Compustat Item #2) between year (t-1) and year t, 
PPEj,t = industry j’s gross property, plant, and equipment (Compustat Item #7) at the end of year t, 
Aj,t-1 = industry j’s the total assets (Comustat Item #6) at the end of year t-1. 
 
The industry-specific estimates of parameters from Equation (2) imply an expected association between 
non-discretionary accruals and accounting variables for firms in industry j. Thus, the non-discretionary accruals for 
firm i in year t can be computed as follows: 
 
NDAi,t = αj,t(1/Ai,t-1 ) + β1j,t [(ΔREVi,t – ΔRECEi,t)/Ai,t-1] + β2j,t[PPEi,t/Ai,t-1]      (3) 
 
The absolute value of discretionary accruals for firm i in year t is computed as follows: 
 
| DAi,t | = | TAi,t – NDAi,t |                                                                                      (4) 
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Empirical Specification 
 
We use the following regression to test the association between corporate reputation and earnings quality.  
 
| DAi,t | = β0 + β1*Reputation + β2*TAi,t + β3*LEVi,t + β4*MTBi,t + ε                                              (5) 
 
Where  
 
| DAi,t | = the absolute value of discretionary accruals for firm i in year t; 
Reputation =“1” if the firm is on the American’s Most Admired Company list in 2006,    otherwise, “0”.  
TAi,t = firm i’s total assets in year t; 
LEVi,t = total debt (Compustat Item #9+#34) /total assets (Compustat Item #6) of firm i in year t; 
MTBi,t = market-to-book ratio (Compustat Item #199x#25 divided by #60) of firm i in year t. 
 
Three variables are included to control for firm size, leverage, and the market-to-book ratio.   
 
Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
 
We use the list of America’s Most Admired Companies as a proxy for good corporate reputation consistent 
with prior work (e.g. McLaughlin et al., 1996; Robert and Dowling, 2002; Damodaran, 2003; Anderson and Smith, 
2006; Wang and Smith, 2008). Since the list of America’s Most Admired Companies of 2006 was published in 
March 2006, we use the prior year’s (2005) financial data in our analysis.  For each sample firm, a matching firm 
with the closest firm size (measured by total assets) within the same industry is selected.  
 
We obtain the company list of America’s Most Admired Companies of 2006 from Fortune Magazine1. The 
full list consists of 303 firms. We remove 36 financial institutions (SIC 6000 – 6999) in this study because it is 
difficult to define accruals and unexpected accruals for these companies. Another 44 firms are excluded due to 
missing Compustat data. Thus, our final sample consists of 223 firms. Panel A of Table 1 reconciles the sample 
selection process. Panel B in Table 1 presents the sample’s distribution across broad industry categories. For 
instance, 105 out of the 223 firms are from the manufacturing industries, while only one firm is from the agriculture, 
forestry and fisheries industries. 
 
 
Table 1 
Sample Selection and Industry Distribution 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
  Sample Size 
2006 Most-Admired Firm List  303 
Finance Firms2  -36 
Firms missing data on Compustat  -44 
Final Sample  223 
 
Panel B: Industry Distribution 
Industry Number of Firms 
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (SIC 01-09) 1 
Mineral Industries (SIC 10-14) 11 
Construction Industries (SIC 15-17) 3 
Manufacturing Industries (SIC 20-39) 105 
Transportation, communication and utilities (SIC 40-49) 40 
Wholesale (SIC 50-51) 11 
Retail (SIC 52-59) 25 
Service (SIC 70-89) 27 
Total  223 
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Panel A of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of selected variables from sample firms and matched 
firms. These variables include the absolute value of discretionary accruals (| DA|), total assets (TA), total debt (TD), 
leverage (LEV), the market-to-book ratio (MTB), return on assets (ROA), and return on equity (ROE). For sample 
firms, the mean and median values of | DA| are 0.0129 and 0.009, respectively.  For matched firms, the mean and 
median values of | DA| are 0.0166 and 0.0108, respectively. It appears that sample firms on average have lower 
discretionary accruals, relative to matched firms.  
 
Sample firm control variables of have higher mean and median values than those of matched firms except 
for the leverage ratio (LEV). For instance, the mean value of total assets of the sample firms is $24,390.32, while the 
mean value of total assets of the matched firms is $18,390.09. The above findings are not surprising
3
, since firms 
selected on the America’s Most Admired Company list are usually larger firms.  
 
Panel B of Table 2 reports mean paired differences between sample firms and matched firms. We use both 
the t-test and the Wilcoxon test to measure the significance of differences.  Both tests indicate that the paired 
differences in the absolute value of discretionary accruals, total assets, the leverage ratio (LEV) and return on assets 
(ROA) are significant.  
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
                                              Sample Firms (n=223)                                                               Matched Firms (n=223) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Median  Mean Std. Dev. Median 
| DAi,t | 0.0129 0.0146 0.0090  0.0166 0.0229 0.0108 
TA 24,390.32 39,469.00 10,358.00  18,390.09 30,183.33 7,983.10 
TD 5,412.33 10,882.00 1,748.00  4,567.27 8,795.00 1,696.20 
LEV 0.2097 0.1406 0.1944  0.2463 0.1455 0.2378 
MTB 4.0300 5.1184 2.9700  3.5389 6.8609 2.2800 
ROA 7.5583 5.5232 6.8800  5.6530 5.0054 4.9500 
ROE 19.1000 37.9076 16.1700  16.1335 42.0055 13.5200 
 
Panel B: Paired Difference in Mean 
  T-test  Wilcoxon Test 
  (p-value)  (p-value) 
| DAi,t |  0.043  0.0405 
TA  0.072  0.0322 
TD  0.3676  0.636 
LEV  0.007  0.0077 
MTB  0.3921  0.0006 
ROA  0.0002  <0.0001 
ROE  0.4341  0.0014 
Variable Definitions: 
| DA| = the absolute value of discretionary accrual in 2005; 
TA = total assets in 2005; 
TD = total debt in 2005; 
LEV = total debt/total asset; 
MTB = market-to-book ratio; 
ROA = return on assets; 
ROE = return on equity. 
 
 
Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables in Table 2. Some variables are correlated at a 
significant level. The correlation coefficient between the absolute value of discretionary accruals (| DA|) and 
reputation is -0.0959, with a p-value of 0.043. This implies a significant and negative relationship between the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals and total assets.  In addition, the correlation coefficient between total assets 
(TA) and reputation is 0.0853, with a p-value of 0.072.  This suggests that firms with good reputations are larger 
firms.  
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Table 3 
Pearson Correlations among the Variables 
 | DAi,t | Reputation TA LEV MTB ROA 
       
Reputation -0.0959      
(p-value, two-tailed) 0.0430      
TA 0.0039 0.0853     
(p-value, two-tailed) 0.9350 0.0720     
LEV -0.0135 -0.1275 0.0221    
(p-value, two-tailed) 0.7768 0.0070 0.6411    
MTB -0.0023 0.0406 -0.0795 0.0952   
(p-value, two-tailed) 0.9614 0.3921 0.0934 0.0446   
ROA -0.0701 0.1783 -0.0663 -0.3547 0.2024  
(p-value, two-tailed) 0.1393 0.0002 0.1623 <0.0001 <0.0001  
ROE 0.0103 0.0371 -0.0169 0.0667 0.7139 0.4516 
(p-value, two-tailed) 0.8276 0.4341 0.7227 0.1594 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Variable Definitions: 
| DA| = the absolute value of discretionary accrual in 2005; 
Reputation = “1” of the firm is on the America’s Most Admired Companies of 2006, otherwise, “0”; 
TA = total assets in 2005; 
LEV = total debt/total asset; 
MTB = market-to-book ratio; 
ROA = return on assets; 
ROE = return on equity. 
 
 
Table 4 
Regression Analysis 
Model:  
| DAi,t | = β0 + β1*Reputation + β2*TAi,t + β3*LEVi,t + β4*MTBi,t + ε                          (5) 
 
Results: (n = 446) 
     Variance  
Variables Parameter Estimates Std. Error t-stat  Pr>|t| Inflation 
      
Intercept 0.01725 0.00212 8.14 <0.0001 
Reputation -0.00388 0.00185 -2.10 0.0366* 1.02846 
TA 7.38E-09 2.61E-08 0.28 0.7777 1.01618 
LEV -0.00363 0.00643 -0.56 0.5728 1.02889 
MTB 0.000017 0.00015 0.11 0.9094 1.01979 
Adjusted R2 = 0.00114 
* significant at 0.05, two-tailed test. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
| DA| = the absolute value of discretionary accrual in 2005; 
Reputation =1 of the firm is on the America’s Most Admired Companies of 2006, otherwise, “0”; 
TA = total assets in 2005; 
LEV = total debt/total asset; 
MTB = market-to-book ratio; 
 
 
4.  RESULTS 
 
To test our hypothesis that firms with high reputation have high earnings quality, we run the regression 
model (Equation 5). If the hypothesis is true, we expect a significant and negative relation between the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals and corporate reputation. Table 4 reports the results of our regression analysis. As 
shown in Table 4, β1 is -0.00388 and significant at p = 0.0366. Thus, our hypothesis is supported. We included three 
control variables in our regression analysis. Results indicate the absolute value of discretionary accruals is positively 
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related to firm size and market-to-book ratio, and negatively related to leverage ratio. However, the above 
relationships are not statistically significant.  
 
We also check for multicollinearity in the regression model, by calculating the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) for each variable. The last column of Table 4 reports the VIF values. Each variable’s VIF value is relatively 
small (i.e., less than 10) indicating that there is no multicollinearity among variables in our regression model. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
This study examines the association between corporate reputation and the quality of the firm’s earnings. 
We posit that firms with superior reputation also should have superior earnings quality. Using the modified Jones 
(1991) model and regression analysis, we find evidence to support our hypothesis. Our results should be of interests 
to managers who engage in behavior leading to or maintaining a positive corporate reputation and to financial 
analysts who conduct research on determining the earnings quality of a firm. Moreover, our study can increase 
individual investors’ confidence in assessing the earnings quality of firms with superior reputations. 
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Notes: 
 
1. http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/mostadmired/2006/index.html 
2. Financial institutions are excluded in this study, because it is difficult to define accruals and unexpected 
accruals for these companies. 
3. Wang and Smith (2008) use the America’s Most Admired Companies of 2005 list and match their sample 
firms based on total assets. Their results indicate that the total assets of sample firms are significantly larger 
than those of matched firms. They report the mean value of total assets for sample firms is $37,656.23, 
while the mean value of total assets for matched firms is $26,835.10. 
4. Other studies that use modified Jones (1991) model also report relatively low adjusted R2’s in their 
regression analysis. For instance, Wright et al. (2006) report an adjusted R
2
 of 0.0492.   
